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Abstract 
This thesis, aiming to contribute to a better understanding of why Croats in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina fear a Bosniak-dominated state, is a response to development 
efforts of the international community to democratize Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
society, generate a shared sense of nationhood among all citizens and speed up its 
path towards Euro-Atlantic integrations. With the use of conceptual framework, 
the issue of fear was further abstracted in order to allow for a more meaningful 
analysis and explanation. Fear in this particular research was thus seen as a set of 
perceived identity threats that stem from intergroup relations in which one group 
(Bosniaks) is more dominant. In order to better understand the resistance to state 
wide integration and the idea of shared state identity that the international 
community promotes, it was necessary to address the reasons why and in which 
ways do Croats perceive their own national identity to be threatened by examining 
everyday situations and experiences of a small group of respondents (nine Croats 
from central Bosnia). Furthermore, in order to generate better understanding of 
the issue and allow for a more comprehensive analysis it was important to 
understand the ways in which Croats from central Bosnia understand and 
construct their national identity. The research suggests that the perception of 
identity threat among the respondents predominantly relates to the issues of 
economic discrimination of Croats in central Bosnia. The research concludes that 
the prospects of the integrated state and the prospects of shared identity in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina highly depend on properly managed intergroup relations that 
would enable ethnic groups to achieve equality in various aspects. 
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1. Introduction 
The former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, having been one of the six 
republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was populated 
by the three largest and ethnically distinct peoples, the Muslims (Bosniaks), the 
Serbs and the Croats. None of the groups were taking the majority position and 
they lived in peace alongside each other and with each other, although with a 
history of previous conflicts (Malcolm, 2000). With the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 resulted in 
the bloody conflict that took around 100,000 lives. This did not end until the 
Dayton Peace Agreement took place in 1995. The Peace Agreement also 
transformed the inner structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by acknowledging the 
existence of the two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republic of 
Srpska dominated by Serbs. In the Bosniak-Croat Federation Croats are highly 
outnumbered and often outvoted by Bosniaks due to the international 
community’s1 employed democratization mechanism which prevents them from 
protecting their vital national interests in a state decision-making. This situation is 
considered to be one of the main sources of social and political crises in the 
shared entity. At the same time while the international community forces 
membership into a common (higher-level) national category, i.e. Bosnian-
Herzegovinian, it is argued that Croats in general identify themselves first by 
nationality (Croatian), they fear a Bosniak-dominated centralized government and 
prefer higher autonomy, whereas Bosniaks in general call for a more unified 
country and are keen to identify with the state. As a counterweight to existing 
ethnic cleavages and separatist agenda in the country, the international community 
tries to support non-nationalist parties and join state wide institutions in order to 
create a cross-Bosnian challenge to nationally based politics as well as to ensure 
the state’s transition into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This study aims at expanding the 
inquiry of Western efforts to reconcile violently divided society in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by integrating state wide institutions and promoting a shared state 
(civic) identity among its citizens.  
The author devised a conceptual framework that sets the current socio-political 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the appropriate theoretical perspective that 
all together enabled a closer definition of research objectives. Theoretical 
considerations provided a viewpoint that sees the fear of domination as a result of 
perceived identity threat that stems from intergroup relations. In order to better 
understand the resistance to the ‘integrative agenda’ of the international 
community and the idea of shared state identity, it was necessary to examine the 
                                                 
1
 International Community in the context of BiH is according to Belloni (2009) a “hodgepodge of 
international organizations and bilateral donors led by the Office of the High Representative” 
(OHR) (p. 355). 
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reasons why and in which ways do Croats perceive their own national identity to 
be threatened by exploring everyday situations and experiences that presumably 
generate perceptions of identity threat. Considering the fact that central Bosnia 
represents the most ethnically mixed region where intergroup relations are most 
prominent, the study focuses on a small group of Croats in central Bosnia in order 
to investigate the everyday situations that generate perceptions of identity threat, 
the underlying reasons for these perceptions and their potential consequences. The 
study furthermore recognises that it would be impossible to understand the 
underlying reasons behind the perceptions of identity threat if the research 
wouldn’t look more closely at how Croats from central Bosnia understand and 
construct their own national identity in a contemporary context. The perception of 
identity threat presupposes a national identity, i.e. a group’s self-categorization in 
national terms. If threats are perceived in relation to a group’s identity than how 
and why identity threats occur is highly linked to how people understand and 
construct their identity in the first place. 
1.1. Background 
Already the name of Bosnia and Herzegovina implies a certain dualism. Often 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is referred to as Bosnia. If one uses the term Bosnia, 
instead of the country’s full name, he or she might expect a reaction from a person 
in Herzegovina. In order to avoid this, the study will use the official state 
abbreviation (BiH). Unfortunately, identity-related issues in BiH do not end here. 
The former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, having been one of the six 
republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was populated 
by three largest and ethnically distinct peoples, the Muslims (Bosniaks), the Serbs 
and the Croats. None of the groups were taking the majority position and they 
lived in peace alongside each other and with each other, although with a history of 
previous conflicts (Malcolm, 2000). With the breakup of Yugoslavia, the 
independence of the Republic of BiH in 1992 resulted in the bloody conflict that 
took around 100,000 lives (Sterling, 2012; BBC, 2007). This did not end until the 
Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) took place in 1995. The General Framework 
Agreement of the DPA has a total of eleven annexes. Annex IV currently 
represents the Constitution of BiH (GFA, 1995). The preamble of the Constitution 
confirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of BiH in 
accordance with international law. The final sentence of the preamble mentions 
Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as constituent peoples. The religious affiliations are 
predominantly predetermined among these groups, where Bosniaks are 
traditionally Muslims, Serbs are Orthodox and Croats are Catholics. Even though 
there has been no recent population census2 , estimates show that the population in 
BiH is comprised of approximately 48% Bosniaks, 37% Serbs and 14% Croats 
(CIA, 2000). The DPA Constitution also transformed the inner structure of BiH, 
by acknowledging the existence of two entities (Annex IV, Article I), the 
                                                 
2
 The last population census in BiH was conducted in 1991 before the Bosnian war. 
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Federation and the Republic of Srpska (RS). The Bosniak-Croat Federation covers 
51% and is further divided into 10 cantons, while the RS, dominated by Bosnian 
Serbs, covers 49% of the BiH’s total territory (see Appendix 1). Constitution 
organized the state of BiH by applying the principles of federal regulation where 
the entities have certain responsibilities, rights and a high degree of autonomy. 
Thus, the DPA made BiH a consociational democracy given that the state 
arrangement paid respect to the four organizational principles that in general 
constitute consociational settlements (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006; Bose, 2002; 
Belloni, 2004): 
- executive power-sharing (three major ethnic groups share in executive 
power),  
- relative autonomy or  
- self-government proportionality (each group is represented proportionally 
in key public institutions and is a proportional beneficiary of public 
resources and expenditures),  
- veto-rights (each group is able to prevent changes that unfavourably affect 
their vital ethnic/national interests)  
 
Such state arrangement created a complex institutional structure, and BiH today is 
one state with two entities, three peoples, three presidents3 and “five layers of 
governance led by 14 prime ministers and governments, making Bosnia the state 
with the highest number of presidents, prime ministers, and ministers per capita in 
the entire world” that all together entails massive administrative costs (Belloni, 
2009: 359). 
In eighteen years after the DPA, the international community has not managed to 
stabilize BiH in many aspects. BiH seems to be in a state of permanent crisis. 
According to the European Union’s (EU) 2010 Progress Report, “BiH has made 
little progress toward establishing a functioning market economy, and major 
reforms will be required to enable the country to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces over the long term” (BTI, 2012: 16). At the same time, the 
unemployment rate continues to increase, from 24.1% in 2009 to 27.2% in 2010, 
according to the BiH Statistics Agency, while according to other sources total 
unemployment rate in BiH is 43,3% thereby ranking BiH 13th out of 199 
countries found on the ‘unemployment list’ (CIA, 2012). BiH is today the poorest 
country in Europe (Eurostat, 2013). The living standard is far below European 
average, despite substantial international development assistance4. Parallel to this, 
                                                 
3
 BiH Presidency consists of three members: one Bosniak and one Croat elected in Federation, and 
one Serb elected in RS. 
4
 BiH has received substantial donor support, with per capita assistance among the highest in post-
conflict countries (UNDP, 2009). Economic growth was enabled “mainly due to external aid for 
peace and reconstruction” (ibid.). 
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the political leadership among all three ethnic groups continues to “exacerbate 
existing cleavages for populist and separatist purposes”, putting the very existence 
of the state in question (BTI, 2012: 2).  The existence of the BiH has in fact been 
in question since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Bosniaks are generally in favour 
of maintaining the country in its internationally recognized borders, while the 
majority of Croats and Serbs fear a Bosniak-dominated centralized government 
and prefer local autonomy and close links with Croatia and Serbia respectively 
(Belloni, 2009). As they see it, the Bosniaks’ relative majority in the country, 
“could lead to the imposition of Bosniak political, cultural, and religious views on 
the rest of the population” (p. 358). None of the ‘three sides’ are satisfied with the 
internal organization of the state and the DPA Constitution. The reasons for the 
dissatisfaction of all three sides are summarized in the following: 
Serbian political leaders from the RS in general want greater autonomy for their 
entity and the most influential and prominent political leader in RS, Milorad 
Dodik, has called for a referendum on the full independence of the RS from BiH 
(The Guardian, 2011).  
The Bosniak political leadership in general wants a more centralized state where 
political decisions wouldn’t have to be taken through ethnical consensus, and 
where, consequently, they could arguably have demographical advantage being 
the most populous ethnic group. Bosniaks frequently condemned the existence of 
the RS since they consider RS to be founded on extensive ethnic cleansing of the 
non-Serb population during the war “and have called for its abolition in favour of 
a stronger, unified government in Sarajevo” (Belloni, 2009: 361). The existence of 
RS furthermore remains controversial, given that The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the United Nations (UN) court of 
law, dealing with war crimes in the Balkans, has ruled that “it has been proven 
beyond reasonable doubt that the mass murder at Srebrenica was genocide”  
(ICTY). 
Croats do not have a territorial unit they can govern autonomously, as opposed to 
Serbs, and they share political power in the Bosniak-Croat Federation in which 
they are outnumbered (and often outvoted) by the demographically stronger 
Bosniaks (Belloni, 2004, 2009). Thus, Croatian leadership (generally represented 
by the Croatian Democratic Party – HDZ BiH), being alarmed by the 
unfavourable position of Croats in BiH, has frequently requested autonomous 
entity with a Croatian majority. In 2001, Croatian political leadership withdrew 
from participation in the convening of the Federation’s government and declared 
“temporary Croat self-government”, also refered to as ‘Herzeg-Bosnia’ (ESI, 
2001: 14). However, the international community took certain actions to disband 
the self-government (ESI, 2001; Belloni, 2009). A third entity that would be 
exclusively ethnically defined would “never be acceptable to Bosniaks” (Bose, 
2002: 31). One of the biggest obstacles for creating the third (Croatian) entity is 
the complexity in partitioning the two ethnically (nationally) mixed cantons, 
Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton as opposed to the remaining 
cantons that are ethnically more homogeneous (ibid.). Bose continues to claim 
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that the concerns of ordinary Croats regarding their institutional status in BiH are 
“exaggerated” (p. 31). Even though those concerns are not unfounded, they are far 
from being sufficient to approve of partition. 
On the other hand, the international community represented by the High 
Representative of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), who has the 
highest political authority in BiH, pushes for further integration, making their 
agenda in compliance with Bosniaks’ ‘vision’ of the state (UNDP, 2009; ICG, 
2002; Belloni, 2004). Since the DPA in 1995, the international community and 
OHR have been involved in the democratization process in BiH, and EU 
membership continues to be a driving factor for further democratization. One of 
the major tasks of the OHR and the international community is to ensure BiH’s 
transition into a “peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration in Euro-
Atlantic institutions” (OHR, 2012). The former High Representative of the OHR, 
Paddy Ashdown, claims in his interview that a breakup of BiH would not happen 
peacefully and that the potential dissolution of BiH has far greater implications. 
Ashdown (2011) claims that Bosniaks would never allow “themselves to be 
trapped into a tiny pocket in central Bosnia, isolated, let down by Europe yet 
again and surrounded on all sides by their enemies” and continues to say that in 
the case of separation there is a high probability of a renewed armed conflict. 
Furthermore, he says, even in the case where the armed conflict could be avoided, 
the incapability of the international community to suspend the Europe’s oldest 
Islamic community (Bosnian Muslims) from isolation would have far reaching 
consequences for the processes of peaceful global integrations and democracy. 
As a counterweight to existing ethnic cleavages and separatist agendas, the 
international community and the OHR tried to support non-nationalist parties and 
join state wide institutions in order to create a “cross-Bosnian challenge to 
nationally based politics” (SAFAX, 1998 and Numanovic, 1998 in Chandler, 
2000: 112) and allow democratic changes in the Constitution without which BiH 
cannot apply for the EU membership. These attempts were seen as bound to 
favour the majority - Bosniaks, who could arguably turn state institutions into 
tools for domination, especially in the Federation where they share power with 
largely outnumbered Croats (Belloni, 2004). In the process of democratizing BiH, 
the international community laid its fingers on the electoral engineering of the 
state what provoked serious political crises. The International community has 
changed the rules for the election of the House of Peoples5 of the Federation. The 
effect of the changes was the deviation of key principles where the Bosniaks 
elected Bosniak and Croats elected Croatian candidates in the House of Peoples – 
the provision embedded in the DPA Constitution. With amended provisions, 
Bosniaks can vote for Croatian candidates and vice versa, whereas previously 
each constituent people voted only for their representatives (ESI, 2001). The basic 
idea of the House of Peoples in the Federation – to represent and protect the 
                                                 
5
 The House of Peoples of BiH is one of the two chambers of the state parliament consisting of 5 
Bosniaks, 5 Serbs and 5 Croats. 
Intergroup Relations and the Perception of Identity Threat 
 
   
8 
 
collective rights of each constituent peoples (major ethnic group), was thus 
annulled by this measure to the detriment of the largely outnumbered Croats. In 
practice, this meant that the number of delegates in the House of Peoples loyal to 
the Croatian nationalist party (HDZ BiH), which usually gets most votes from 
Croats in BiH, drops and the control over veto rights that serve protection of vital 
interests of Croats weakens (p. 14). The allocation of seats in the high legislative 
bodies (Presidency, House of Peoples) is usually achieved “on the basis of 
ethnicity” as all major ethnic groups are guaranteed equal representation in the 
key state institutions (Chandler, 2000: 111). In 2010 elections the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), non-nationalist party that appeals across the ethnic 
divide, obtained the largest number of seats in the parliament, and its candidate, 
ethnically Croat, retained the Croatian seat in the presidency. However, results 
showed that Croats gave most of their votes to the Croatian nationalist parties. 
This meant that the SDP candidate was elected with a large help of Bosniak votes 
(The Economist, 2010). Electoral changes thus allow Croatian representatives to 
be appointed by the parties that do not have support from the majority of the 
Croatian electorate. In this way, outnumbered Croats stay deprived of the 
representatives that are appointed from the parties they voted for, while Bosniaks 
retain their own. 
The governance structure has been the subject of many local and international 
attempts to reform the Constitution so as to create a state able to integrate into the 
EU and join The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The EU accession 
process requires functional institutions and effective coordination mechanisms at 
all levels what should allow “the country to speak with one voice”, as well as a 
constitution that complies with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) (European Commission, 2012: 1). This, however, does not imply 
domination of the Bosniak majority, but quicker and more efficient method in 
reaching compromise6. However, none of these attempts have produced stable 
results, and constitutional reform remains one of the country’s most contentious 
political issues (BTI, 2012). In BiH, formal citizenship is generally not withheld 
from minority groups and there is a continued constitutional discrimination 
against individuals that do not belong to one of the three constituent groups which 
participate in the country’s power-sharing agreement (ICG, 2012). In 2009, in the 
case ‘Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ECHR held that the racial or 
ethnic-based exclusion of Jews and Roma from BiH’s highest elected offices 
constituted unlawful discrimination (Council of Europe, 2013). Under the Annex 
IV of the DPA, only those belonging to one of the three constituent peoples in 
BiH are permitted to stand for election to the House of Peoples or for the 
                                                 
6
 Most recently, this problem in achieving compromise occurs in connection with Croatian EU 
accession:  
BiH will no longer be able to export agricultural products  to Croatia. The reason is that BiH’s 
politicians can’t agree on who should assess whether their producers meet EU’s regulations. 
Bosniaks want the certification done by a central body, whereas Serbs want the job done by the 
separate entity agencies (Economist, 2013). 
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presidency, thus excluding members of the country’s 14 other national minorities 
(others). BiH authorities failed to reach an agreement on implementation of the 
ECHR ruling before the 2010 general elections were announced, thus constituting 
a breach of Article II of the country’s Interim Agreement with the European 
Union. The ECHR has ruled that the current Constitution of BiH is in breach of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (Sejdic and Finci v BiH, 2009). 
However, in spite of this legal recognition that the Constitution is undemocratic, it 
remains unchanged (BTI, 2012: 4).  
In 2002 democratization process in BiH led to signing of the ‘Sarajevo 
Agreement’ that was perceived as a BiH’s major step towards democratic 
development and the rule of law (ICG, 2002). However, Bosnian Croats were 
alarmed by the inclusion of others (minority groups) in the Federal Parliament. 
Croat politicians were concerned that the majority Bosniaks could abuse the 
category of ‘others’ to achieve further ‘majorization’7 (majorizacija) through 
‘phoney others’, implying that they are an empty category that can easily be 
manipulated to produce extra Bosniak votes (ICG, 2002: 14). Signers of the 
Agreement in general defended the inclusion of others as it would be 
undemocratic and backward to politically dismiss all the minority groups and 
individuals who consider themselves primarily to be citizens, or simply as 
‘Bosnian-Herzegovinians’, recognizing civic identity and civic nationalism as a 
legitimate concept and a social reality that in general stands against dominant 
ethnic nationalism (ibid.). Interests of individual ethnic groups continue to prevail, 
and the rhetoric of ethnic political leaders dominates the political space in BiH. 
This marginalizes the EU agenda, as well as any other potentially pro-democratic 
agenda. This is because the question of national identity in BiH still bears the 
greatest importance (BTI, 2012). One can hardly speak of a shared Bosnian-
Herzegovinian national identity because of the presumable lack of common 
characteristics among constitutive peoples (major ethnic groups) what disables 
economic, social and political sense of unity. Different types of conflict identity 
are present in almost all aspects of life and prevent the successful functioning of 
its citizens. The concept of ‘nationality’ is usually linked to a country. In BiH, the 
term is rather linked to ‘ethnicity’. The majority of Serbs from RS, for that matter, 
“identify themselves with the entity rather than the state” whereas Croats “identify 
themselves first by nationality” (UNDP, 2009: 15). Only the Bosniaks are in 
general eager to identify with the term ‘Bosnian nation’ (ibid.). Furthermore, apart 
from BiH citizenship, Serbs and Croats are entitled to Croatian and Serbian 
citizenship respectively. Most Bosniaks, however, only hold BiH citizenship. 
“State-level ownership can only have meaning if both entities are in agreement, so 
effective national (country) ownership requires extensive advocacy, political 
dialogue and negotiation at the entity level. Many development challenges, such 
as creating a single economic space, can only be met if the entities (and within the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the cantons) assume common ownership” 
(UNDP, 2009: 15). 
                                                 
7
 Majorization is here mentioned and perceived as a negative side of the principle of majority rule. 
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Until now there has been hardly any scientific research conducted to examine 
more closely the reasons behind the resistance to state integration and the 
promotion of a shared state identity in BiH. Analysing the reasons behind this 
resistance could generate a better understanding of the problems that stem from 
intergroup relations and reveal a more thorough image of the complex socio-
political and economic situation in BiH. However, analysis of the problems that 
arise from the background of this research, which primarily relates to the issues of 
intergroup relations in a divided society, can be undertaken from a variety of 
perspectives. In order to approach the problem, which stems from the background, 
from a more scientific level and in order to engage in a more narrow analysis and 
explanation of the problem, it was important to understand and problematize the 
background with a help of contextual framework. This in turn helped the author to 
end the struggle over the choice of approach to setting the problem more 
concisely and develop a more narrow research question.  
Intergroup Relations and the Perception of Identity Threat 
 
   
11 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Conceptual framework is a structure that stems from a broad set of concepts and 
theories that assist a researcher to properly identify the problem he or she wishes 
to study and frame their research questions (Smyth, 2004). Usually, researchers 
use a conceptual framework at the beginning of a research because it helps the 
researcher to understand and validate the subject he wishes to study, clarify the 
research questions and aims (ibid.). There are a number of concepts and theories 
that also could have been included in the following framework, but given the 
background of this research the time limitation and scope, the researcher tried to 
find the most important concepts and theories that could assist in a more clear 
identification of the problem that stems from the background of this research. 
Any discussion about a nation, ethnic/national identity, and social identity in 
general is hampered by serious terminological difficulties. Therefore, when we 
embark on a study of the phenomenon of social identity we come across two close 
and yet different concepts: ethnic and national. It is important to observe the 
distinction between these two concepts, especially in the context of BiH. As noted 
earlier, there are three major ethnic groups in BiH: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. 
The concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity imply a common cultural tradition, 
sense of community and closeness that is identified with a particular group based 
on some particular characteristics (religion, language, etc.), and which exists as a 
subgroup of a larger group (Gregory, 2009). According to this definition, 
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats in BiH are ethnic groups that live in the common state 
and two different entities. However, since there is hardly any sense of shared 
national identity among these three major ethnic groups, these groups are often 
referred to as national groups. This study uses terms ethnic and national 
interchangeably when referring to Bosniak, Serbian or Croatian national identity, 
and uses civic, shared, or state identity when referring to either national identity 
of individuals that consider themselves primarily to be citizens of BiH, or a 
common (higher-level) national identity (Bosnian-Herzegovinian) that the 
international community is trying to promote in BiH.  
The concept of nationality and national identity usually refers to a country. In 
BiH, however, only the Bosniaks see themselves as a part of the “Bosnian nation” 
(ICG, 2002: 14). A great majority of Serbs and Croats usually identify only with 
their own respective ethnic groups, i.e. they do not share the sense of Bosnian-
Herzegovinian nationhood with Bosniaks. There are those who argue that there is 
a substantial number of individuals in BiH who consider themselves primarily to 
be citizens, or simply ‘Bosnian-Herzegovinians’, implying a civic or state 
identity, and whose interests should also be institutionally defended (ICG, 2002). 
Scholarly literature on ethnic identity and division is grouped around two 
contrasting views, primordial and constructed (Jenkins, 1996; Hale, 2004). 
Primordialism views national identity as something objective acquired by birth 
and fixed, while constructionism sees national identity as socially constructed, 
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different for each individual and constantly in flux. This thesis furthermore 
recognizes a distinction between the two categories of national identity and 
nationalism, ethnic and civic (Ignatieff, 1993).  
Ethnic nationalism is based on the people's loyalty to an ethnic group, and not to a 
larger political entity, or state, which may include many ethnicities and/or 
nationalities. Here, nation is founded on "not the cold contrivance of shared 
rights, but the people's pre-existing ethnic characteristics: their language, religion, 
customs and traditions" (Ignatieff 1993: 4). Structuring society and politics on the 
basis of ethnicity is by many viewed as negative and backward. Horowitz (1985) 
argues that such structuring ultimately leads to a society characterized by ethnic 
groupings at the expense of shared identities and interspersed settlements, 
promote the rule of kin, instead of the rule of law, where sharing the same 
genealogy will be reassurance for assuming social status.  
Adversely, central to the idea of civic identity and civic nationalism is the 
possibility for citizens to adopt national identity by choice. Nation based on the 
principles of civic identity sees citizenship as primary, rather than prior 
membership in a descent group or cultural tradition (Ignatieff 1993). The 
relationship between citizenship and nation should thus be an act where common 
people demonstrate their capability to base their union on social consensus, 
pertaining to common legal system and common political institutions. The nation 
of citizens would not be derived from the constituent ethnic and cultural common 
properties, but from the ability of citizens to appropriate civil rights, politically 
participate and arrange equal cooperation of free individuals. Despite different 
ethnic identities, a superordinate civic national identity could construct a platform 
on which conflict can be peacefully negotiated. All citizens can claim allegiance 
to a shared national identity and claim rights on all of the shared public resources. 
Civic conception sees nation as a political, self-governing, democratic 
community, with legal and political equality among its citizen-members (Smith, 
1991). This distinction is however problematic, as “rhetoric of civic nationalism 
and citizenship can mask underlying commitments to particularistic cultural or 
racial definitions of what counts as a proper or good citizen” (Calhoun, 2007: 42). 
Recent experimental work has demonstrated that even people who sincerely adopt 
civic understanding of nation nonetheless show tendencies to construct their 
national identity in ethno-racial terms (Devos and Ma, 2008). Smith (1995) 
furthermore argues that civic nationalism is “neither as tolerant nor as unbiased as 
its self-image suggests” and that it can be very uncompromising as well and that it 
often demands the surrender of individuality, “the privatisation of religion and the 
marginalisation of ethnic culture and heritage of minorities within the borders of 
the national state" (p.186). National is not only defined from within, the common 
features that fellow-nationals share together, but also from the outside 
(Triandafyllidou, 1998). National characteristics become meaningful only through 
the process of ‘otherisation’. Thus, national identities in BiH are being formed in 
comparison to other national identities in the same state. Given that most 
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Bosniaks identify with the state, they can be perceived as a proper or good 
citezens of BiH. 
Central to the subject of this study is the presence of ethnicization and 
majorization of the democratic process in BiH. Ethnicization in democracy 
appears since nationalist parties are confined by the interests of the specific ethnic 
group they represent. This principle thus undermines the dimensions of civil 
society, citizenship and socioeconomic issues. Majorization is the aspect of 
democracy that enables the rule of majority. Given the fact that the Bosnian 
Croats are ethnically outnumbered and lack institutional protection, majorization 
enables situations in which vital interests of the Croatian people in BiH are 
potentially ignored or dismissed in the parliamentary debates. Thus Croats from 
BiH perceive their position relative to that of Bosniaks as underprivileged. 
Hechter (1975, 1978) argues that nationalism can lead to unity as well as disunity 
that challenges legitimacy of the state, especially if certain groups are relegated to 
underprivileged positions. Thus, individuals from a group that is less privileged 
will feel greater resentment towards dominant group, whereby individuals from 
the ‘inferior’ group that are ‘better off’ will develop more positive feelings 
towards dominant group and/or official state nationalism. In Hechter’s terms, 
working class members are more likely to embrace minority (ethnic) identity 
rather than the one of a ‘higher social class’. According to Lustick (1979) 
disunion is reinforced by historically embedded patterns of social segregation and 
endogamy, meaning that the levels of intergroup distrust and hostility are high, 
economic growth is low, “membership is clear and, with few exceptions, 
unchangeable” (p. 325).  
In the aftermath of an ethnic violent conflict, in the process of peace-building, 
rather than forcing conflicted sides to glue the broken societal fragments through a 
shared state identity, consociational arrangements, such as the DPA in BiH, often 
institutionalize the existence of ethnic differences. The concept of consociational 
democracy was introduced by Arend Lijphart (1969). The consociational model 
tries to ‘help’ establish democracy in deeply divided societies, societies in which 
there are a number of collective identities, none of which have the absolute 
numerical advantage. In such a situation, it is argued, consociational democracy is 
the best democracy, as it is the most realistic (pragmatic). The veto-right principle 
in connection to proportional representation and the autonomy of the segments is 
a mechanism of the consociational settlement that acts against the domination of 
the demographically advantageous groups, or the mechanism by which collective 
identities are protected from domination by other collectives. Consociational 
principles of governance thus avoid majoritarian political systems in which the 
competition for power allows exclusion of smaller groups from sharing political 
power. Proponents of consociationalism argue that ethnic identities and divisions 
that stem from it are “resilient rather than rapidly biodegradable and that they 
must be recognized rather than wished away” (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 338). 
Moreover, ethnic groups are unlikely to melt down into one common or shared 
identity at any conceivable point (ibid.). 
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Another approach to peace building and societal reconciliation in a post-conflict 
society is provided by the so called centripetalists who aim at integration of 
different ethnic/national groups through advocacy of non-nationalist politics, i.e. 
the adoption of electoral methods that will force parties to adopt more 
moderate positions in an effort to obtain votes from across the ethno-
national divide (Horowitz, 2001). It is argued that the integrative approach of the 
centrapetalists does not reward extremism. It rather builds foundation for its 
neutralization that in turn leads to a shared civic (state) identity.  Shared public 
identity enables “liberal justice and democratic politics” (Moore, 2001: 2), 
appropriation of civil rights what in turn strengthens civil society (Ignatieff, 1993; 
Belloni 2004). Furthermore, civil society is seen to possess the biggest capacity 
for achieving dialogue and compromise among various stakeholders what permits 
sustainable peace-building, enhances “development cooperation” and “security” 
(Paffenholz, 2010: 47, 23). Consociationalism, on the other hand, ensures group-
based hostilities that stand on the way to any chance of a shared and reconciled 
society.  
Among the various theoretical approaches used to explain the concept of national 
identity, its construction and social issues that stem from it, the most appropriate 
theoretical approach to tackle the problem of this particular research is perceived 
here to be formulated in Social Identity Theory (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner (1979; 
1986), and Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) by Stephan and Stephan (2000). 
According to Tajfel and Turner, identity of every man implies the existence of 
social identity that stems from an individual belonging to different social groups. 
National identity is part of a social identity that is based on the feeling of 
belonging to a national group. Only group membership enables a sense of 
belongingness that contributes to a positive self-concept. The primary motivation 
of the individual, as a group member, is to develop a positive social identity, 
because this contributes to one’s mental health, feeling of security, self-value, 
self-esteem, sense of community, etc. In order to achieve this, the group seeks to 
be positively perceived. However, when belonging to a group does not bring those 
benefits (self-esteem, security, etc.) but the opposite, we talk about negative social 
identity. Such identity can be developed in relationships between national groups, 
in which one group develops low self-esteem because individuals perceive 
themselves as members of an inferior group. Accordingly, there are the two ways 
in which such situation is managed: 
- Discard the current social identity and convert to dominant group 
(negative psychological consequences)  
- Preserve the existing identity and develop a group ‘defence’ mechanism 
(implies intensification of national identity and nationalist attitudes) 
The latter is accomplished by the development of pride within the group, i.e. re-
establishment of positive self-concept or worth in comparison to other groups. 
When it comes to ethnic/national groups, this is achieved by a ‘self-serving’ 
comparison with other ethnic groups in a way that the outcome of the comparison 
turns out positive for the one's own group. This is done by emphasising another 
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group's features that are ‘known’ to have a characteristic that is worse, or has a 
negative connotation, while in one's own group the same features are strong or 
positive.  In other words, in order to achieve and maintain a positive social 
identity a group will insist on those dimensions on which the comparison is 
favourable for them, and ignore the dimensions on which the comparison is 
unfavourable. The most distinctive identification with one’s own group will 
follow when the boundaries among groups are perceived as impermeable, when 
status relations are unstable, and when differences are perceived as illegitimate. 
According to Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) the SIT has three central 
components: 
- Self-Categorization, where a person must categorize (identify) oneself as a 
member of a group in order to have its self-esteem elevated through 
association with the group. 
- Group Self-Esteem is a component that refers to the situation in which 
self-esteem or self-identity is gained through membership in a 
group.  Membership in a group must hold some value for a person, such as 
the possibility to climb the status ladder. 
- Group Commitment refers to the level of the commitment one feels to 
his/hers in-group. The more self-esteem a person acquires by associating 
(identifying) oneself with the respective group, the person will be 
motivated to maintain the group and his/hers own membership in it. 
However, crossing over to another group is harder if the boundaries are 
rigid or impermeable, as in the case when it comes to race, gender, etc. 
 
According to the SIT, social identity is defined as a result of an interactive 
relationship between groups (ethnic/national groups) in which groups define 
themselves in comparison to other groups. This relationship, according to the ITT 
entails competition for status or resources. Riek, Mania & Gaertner (2006) explain 
that “intergroup threat occurs when one group's actions, beliefs, or characteristics 
challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group” (p. 336). In simple 
words, members of one group perceive that they will not have further access to 
resources because another group will use them. In the context of the ITT, the in-
group can be explained as the group with whom an individual identifies with and 
furthermore as the group which potentially feels threatened, where the out-group 
is the group which is posing a threat to the in-group.  
There are two major types of identity threats which cause conflict between groups 
(Stephan and Stephan, 2000):  
- Realistic Threats result from the perceptions, held by the in-group, that the 
out-group represents a risk to their safety, economy, politics, health or 
well-being.   
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- Symbolic Threats refer to the beliefs and values of the group which may be 
at risk.  They primarily involve “perceived group differences in morals, 
values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes” (Stephan et al., 2002: 42).  
3. Problem Formulation and Research Questions 
From the perspectives devised in the contextual framework, the problematic 
intergroup situation in BiH can be outlined and problematized as follows.  
First, the differences between ethnic groups are highly prominent. While peace-
building efforts of the international community and the employed democratization 
mechanisms forces membership into a common (higher-level) national category, 
i.e. Bosnian-Herzegovinian, Croats and Serbs are reluctant to comply. Croats and 
Serbs predominantly identify (self-categorize) themselves by their respective 
ethnic group, they fear a Bosniak-dominated centralized government and in 
general prefer local autonomy, while Bosniaks in general call for a more unified 
country and are keen to identify themselves with BiH. From the SIT perspective, 
the animosity to and fear of another group stems from an intergroup relation in 
which one group is more dominant as in the case of Croat-Bosniak group relations 
in the Federation. From the perspectives of the SIT and ITT, the issue of fear of 
domination and resistance to integration can be observed easier from the 
perspective of Croats in the Federation. 
Second, Croats are highly outnumbered and often outvoted by the 
demographically dominant Bosniaks. Due to the fact that official political 
program of the international community tries to undermine nationally based 
politics and create a greater sense of unity, where Croats are deprived of equal 
representation in respect to Bosniaks, in everyday social comparisons, the latter 
are an important reference group for the former. Moreover, given that most 
Bosniaks identify with the state, they can be perceived as a proper or good 
citezens of BiH. Such situation can affect the notion of an average ‘Bonian-
Herzegovinan’ citizen. Thus, construction of the national identity of Croats highly 
depends on their interaction with Bosniaks. Bosniaks do not just signify an 
important reference group, but because of the unequal nature of the integration 
process, social comparison with Bosniaks potentially results in a negative 
outcome, where Croats, it is argued, are relegated to underprivileged position, are 
‘majorized’ (majoriziracija) and theoretically perceive themselves inferior to 
Bosniaks. what in SIT terms can have negative affect on the groups self-esteem 
(positive self-concept) and group commitment. In Hechter (1975, 1978) terms, if 
certain groups are relegated to underprivileged positions it might potentially 
challenge the stability of the state. Here, members of the inferior group that are 
however economically ‘better off’, will have more positive feelings towards 
dominant group and the state, while the situation is opposite for the people of 
lower economic status. Correspondingly, ITT posits that intergroup interaction 
entails competition for status and resources what often results in the perceptions 
of threat, i.e. Croats being a lower-status group feel that the dominant Bosniaks 
will deprive them of status and resources.  
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Third, the most prominent group interaction between Croats and Bosniaks is in 
central Bosnia, as opposed to other regions that are mostly ethnically 
homogenous. Thus central Bosnia is the region where issues that stem from 
intergroup relations, including perception of threats are most likely to occur in 
daily life terms.  
In order to better understand the attitudes of those who oppose state-wide 
integration and the idea of shared state identity, it is necessary to address reasons 
why and in which ways do Croats perceive their own national identity to be 
threatened by a situation in which international community enables a Bosniak-
dominated state. The fact that central Bosnia represents the most ethnically mixed 
region, the study will focus on Croats in central Bosnia in order to investigate the 
daily situations that generate the feelings of threat, what are the underlying 
reasons for these perceptions and their potential consequences as long as Croats 
from central Bosnia are concerned. Based on this, the research questions this 
study tries to answer are:  
- What are the aspects of daily life in which Croats from central Bosnia 
perceive their identity to be threatened by Bosniaks and a Bosniak-
dominated state? 
- What are the underlying reasons for the perception of these threats and 
what are their potential consequences? 
 
It would be impossible to understand the underlying reasons behind the 
perceptions of identity threat if the research wouldn’t look closely at how Croats 
from central Bosnia understand and construct their own national identity in a 
contemporary context. The perception of identity threat presupposes a national 
identity, i.e. a group’s self-categorization in national terms. If threats are 
perceived in relation to a group’s identity than how and why identity threats occur 
is highly linked to how people understand and construct their identity in the first 
place. In this way, self-categorization of an in-group and perceived threats that 
stem from intergroup relation represent a dependant assembly of variables, the 
analysis of which will hopefully provide a better understanding of the perception 
of threat, their reasons and consequences. Moreover, the use of particular theories 
in this case study may contribute to their better understanding and their practical 
applicability in understanding social problems. 
3.1. Significance 
As evidenced so far, national identity is still an important social category that 
bares great significance in the field of development as it can seriously hamper 
social, political and economic processes of a country and its people. The issues 
pertaining to national identity are standing on the way of the BiH’s development 
and transformation into a viable democracy. Analysing the reasons why Croats in 
central Bosnia perceive their identity to be threatened could contribute to the 
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existing academic knowledge on the subject; explain how intergroup relations and 
perceptions of threat can influences people’s feelings and ultimately their 
behaviour and actions. Furthermore, the analysis of intergroup relations and their 
consequences can offer guidance to government policy-making on their path to 
establishing stable and “healthy democracy” as well as “national legitimacy” 
(Eaton, 2002: 47). Moreover, it can provide a valuable insight on how state and 
nation-building8 efforts of the international community are manifested on the 
ground. The Dictionary of Human Geography (Gregory, 2009) explains how 
questions regarding national identity, nationalism and nation states are central to 
the studies of two sub-disciplines of human geography, namely, political 
geography and social geography (p. 350-351). Finally, socio-political and 
economic development in BiH has far greater implications, something that the 
current High Representative of the OHR, Valentin Inzko, successfully stresses at 
the last UN Security Council meeting. “The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
does not, fortunately, have the immediate security dimensions of the other issues 
that the Security Council is dealing with. But I am sure that the Council will agree 
with me that what happens to Bosnia and Herzegovina matters far beyond its 
borders. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that in so many ways has come to 
symbolize our shared commitment and quest for an integrated European continent 
rooted in lasting peace, stability, prosperity and tolerance” (Inzko, 2013).  
                                                 
8
 Nation building is a “term used in conflict resolution to explain the actions of the 
international community in postwar societies. In this context, the term refers either to a 
preventive measure to avoid the breakup and social fragmentation of the state or to an 
element of post-conflict peace-building strategies” (Parillo, 2008: 607). 
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4. Methodology 
The nature of the research question has direct implications for the type of research 
one employs. To simplify the general school of thought: Qualitative research is 
concerned with words and quantitative research is focused on numbers (Bryman, 
2008). Qualitative research usually aims at gathering an in-depth understanding of 
human relations, behaviour and the motives that direct such behaviour. Thus, 
qualitative method usually provides answers to’ why’ and ‘how’ of the research 
question and does so by putting a focus on smaller samples of data. This study 
aims at understanding how and why Croats in central Bosnia perceive their 
identity to be threatened through everyday life situations. The research considers 
and examines the research subject – the intergroup relations and perceived threats 
that stem from it - in situ, i.e. within the context in which it occurs on the ground, 
or in other words - on the field. Therefore, qualitative approach is chosen for this 
research since it is better suited to capture phenomena in situ. Considering 
research questions, the author wanted to assess a number of parameters, such as, 
perceptions, feelings and generally subjective views of the people involved. 
Accordingly, the author has chosen to conduct qualitative, semi-structured, in-
depth interviews in order to encapsulate the above parameters. The author found 
that qualitative methods allow detailed illustration on how the processes of 
generating perceptions of threat occur from people’s interactions and experiences 
that stem from there. 
The case study design enabled an in-depth analysis of the complex relationships 
and particular nature of the case in question (Bryman, 2008: 52). It furthermore 
allowed the author to pursue an inductive approach, in which he could try to 
identify common themes that are to be analysed, based on opinions and 
observations of a small group of people (respondents).This study wants to 
illustrate people’s understanding of the research problem that could contradict 
with what one often hears from academics or politicians on the same subject. 
Furthermore, the qualitative approach of this study aspires to investigate prospects 
of emergence of the shared, transnational identity in BiH as ‘desired’ by the 
international community. By choosing to conduct a qualitative research, the 
author aimed at contributing to the understanding of how people (Croats from 
central Bosnia) think and feel about the circumstances and situations in which 
they find themselves, and not making judgements about whether those thoughts 
and feelings are valid or justified. Because this research aims at illuminating the 
specific, to identify the social phenomena of self-categorization and identity threat 
through how they are perceived by the actors in a situation, this research is taking 
a phenomenological approach. Phenomenological approach enables description 
and analysis of the individuals’ experiences of the phenomenon (identity threat). 
“The phenomenologist views human behaviour (...) as a product of how people 
interpret the world. (...) In order to grasp the meaning of person’s behaviour, the 
phenomenologists attempt to see things from that person's point of view” (Bogdan 
and Taylor, 1975: 13-14 in Bryman, 2008). The fundamental starting point of this 
approach “resides in the fact that social reality has a meaning for human beings 
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and therefore human action is meaningful - that is, it has a meaning for them and 
they act on the basis of the meanings that they attribute to their acts and to the acts 
of others” (Bryman, 2008: 16). From there, it stems that the job of a researcher is 
to gain access to people's ‘common-sense thinking’ and hence to interpret their 
actions and their social world from their point of view” (ibid.). 
4.1. Stepping into the Field and the Use of Theory 
Although qualitative research is almost always inductive, one should not equate 
theoretical ignorance with an inductive approach. If a researcher is uninformed in 
regards to different perspectives to the problem he or she addresses, he or she will 
not be able to fully understand the data, or analyse it effectively. Thus, it was 
important for the researcher to get a broad grasp of theoretical perspectives on the 
subject he wanted to study before stepping into the field and choose the most 
appropriate set of concepts and theories to identify the research question. The 
research started with a rather general conceptual framework that places the case 
study into a large context and also validates the choice of that particular research. 
The objective of this research was not to formulate a new universal general 
theory, but rather to shed light on a social phenomenon through the case being 
studied. This research is thus aiming at changing the view on theory, or 
contributing to its use and understanding (Bryman, 2008: 94). In this way, 
theoretical perspectives help the researcher to find his way out of the data ‘forest’ 
and set the scope and framework of the research question. Conceptual framework 
here serves as an inspiration for the researcher, but does not necessarily 
undermine the heuristic undertakings of the field work. In Malinowski’s (1961) 
terms “he field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory” (p. 9). 
4.2. Data Collection and Sampling 
In order to answer the research questions, the study focuses on individuals’ 
perception of their national identity (self-categorization), their concerns in regards 
to threats to their identity and future in their homeland. Five main areas of 
research enquiry were prearranged for this study:  
- How do Croats from central Bosnia understand their own identity (what 
are the most fundamental psycho-social elements that encompass the 
contemporary social identity of Croats from central Bosnia)? 
- What are their perceptions of and feelings towards their own 
(ethnic/national) group? 
- Do they feel their identity (status) is threatened in BiH and why is it so? 
- What are their own experiences in relation to that threat; in which spheres 
of life do they mostly occur? 
- How do they see future of BiH and themselves in it? 
Intergroup Relations and the Perception of Identity Threat 
 
   
21 
 
The foundational question in phenomenology usually tries to answer what is the 
meaning of the lived experience of this phenomenon to an individual or a group of 
people. Thus, this researcher is interested in individuals' perception of reality. 
Conducting in-depth interviews is thus a common method in order to reach for the 
individuals' experiences, or in other words the essence of those experiences. 
Phenomenological researchers often search for commonalities across individuals 
and focuses on those aspects that are common for most respondents. 
The field research itself consisted of number of semi-structured, in-depth  
interviews that were conducted on the sample of small group of Croats situated in 
central Bosnia. The author was able to obtain a successful response from 9 people 
consisting of 4 female and 5 male respondents, representing only one nationality 
(Croats), and coming from four different locations in central Bosnia (cities of 
Busovaca, Kiseljak, Vitez and Zenica). All interviews were conducted in the 
period from March 1, 2013 until March 20, 2013. Although the author had a 
prepared set of questions almost all interviews were conducted in a sense where 
the interviewees were encouraged to talk about relevant subjects and share their 
related thoughts, opinions, feelings and experiences. The questions of the 
interview were used only as a guideline for the interviewer and were almost never 
entirely covered during a single interview. Some of the interviews rather 
resembled a structured conversation and ranged from two to four hours. However, 
the interview inquiry ensured a common focus and complete responses in terms of 
topics to be covered. Considering that some of the respondents were interested in 
one topic/question more than other, the author allowed them to pursue the topic in 
depth as he hoped that the overall result would be a richer set of accounts from 
respondents. The interviews were initiated with a short introduction of the 
research project and a clarification/discussion over some basic terminology that 
the study is based upon. Furthermore, all respondents were told that their personal 
identity would remain unrevealed. 
The sampling used in the study was a combination of snowball and purposive 
sampling study (Bryman, 2012:187). The snowball sampling refers to the process 
of recruiting respondents known and recruited by previous subjects, whereas 
purposive sampling is based on the process in which subjects are chosen based on 
certain characteristics of the people. The author based his purposive sampling on 
ethnicity, age, employment and level of education of the respondents. Ethnicity 
was important given that the subjects had to be “Croats from central Bosnia”.  As 
I the author was more interested in people that are politically active and 
supposedly have a greater life experience, he had to consider age of interviewees. 
However, he was also interested in people that are economically active / have 
been employed in recent history because theory suggests that competition and 
status for resources potentially increases perception of threat if one group sees its 
positions as unfavourable due to its ethnic/national background.  Level of 
education was another characteristic that the author was interested in, because he 
had to make sure that people that he interviewed would be able to understand 
basic concepts the study is dealing with. 
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4.3. Data Analysis 
Transcripts of the interviews represent the data which has been processed under 
the principles of qualitative approach. The first step in the analysis was the 
reading of the interviews and selection of the appropriate method of data analysis 
- The thesis applies the thematic analysis model as postulated by Braun and 
Clarke (2006). The theme here is a type of pattern in the data that can principally 
be determined in two ways: by either inductive or deductive method. The 
deductive method, also referred to as theoretical, was chosen for the analysis, with 
topics determined in accordance with the theoretical/analytical interest of the 
thesis. This approach often leads to a less detailed description of the data in its 
entirety, and is more focused on analysis of some aspects of the data. 
The thematic analysis can be semantic or latent. In the semantic analysis themes 
are defined explicitly, meaning that the researcher does not seek hidden (latent) 
meanings of what is found in the data. The latent analysis, on the other hand, 
emphasizes interpretation of the data. 
The research combines both approaches, whereby semantic level was used to 
literally convey the perspectives of respondents, as well as to provide information 
in order to verify the interpretation. It is important to note that all the interviews 
for this thesis were translated and transcribed as heard, leaving the content 
entirely uncensored and not corrected in any way (e.g. without linguistic 
corrections). The process of data analysis began with establishing the framework 
for the interpretation of data through five themes. The themes were determined 
based on the insights into the interviews and in accordance with the conceptual 
framework (section 2.), specifically SIT and ITT theory, and research objectives. 
The themes are as follows: 
- Self-Categorization and intergroup relations (with sub-topics: Homeland 
and belonging, Croats in central Bosnia, Croats and catholicism, Croatian 
language). It would be impossible to understand the reasons behind the 
perceptions of identity threat if the research wouldn’t look closely at how 
Croats from central Bosnia understand and construct their own national 
identity. 
- Intergroup relations and the perception of threats. 
 
The process in which the above themes were established consisted of the 
following steps: 
1. Reading of the full text of the interviews, 
2. defining codes for each interview, 
3. generating and defining  themes within each interview in compliance with 
conceptual framework, 
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4. determining and defining key themes that were common for most 
interviews. 
5. interpreting the obtained results in accordance with the conceptual 
framework and supporting it with certain quotations from the interviews. 
4.4. Scope and Limitations 
A widely discussed limitation is also an issue in this study and refers to the 
selected research design. Since the thesis is based on a single field case study, it is 
facing certain constraints in terms of being able to generalize the findings 
(Bryman, 2008). There is an on-going debate about how valid case studies are in 
respect to being applicable to other situations, but the scope of this thesis and the 
available resources have not allowed for conducting several case studies that 
would have supported or rejected the findings. Consequently, this study represents 
more of a starting point within this specific field of research than a complete and 
totally explored area. Another limitation in respect to interviews is the tendency of 
the respondents to reply based on their assumption of what is a correct or desired 
answer. This corresponds to what Bryman (2008) refers to as a “social desirability 
bias” (p. 218).  
Six out of 9 interview participants allowed the interviews to be voice-recorded. 
Since topics were considered politically sensitive, most participants were worried 
about the privacy of the interview. Consequently, the author had to make written 
notes by often asking respondents to repeat the whole sentences. This has 
considerably influenced the pace of data collection, motivation of the respondents 
and the amount of data that could have been collected given the time limits. 
All interviews were conducted in Croatian language as this is the mother tongue 
of all of the interview participants. This means that all quotes had to be translated 
to English and that some of the connotations might have been lost in this process. 
Having this in mind, the author has to stress that this study does not regard its 
interviewee sample as representative, nor does it aim at generalization, but simply 
tries to delve into honest human feelings, concerns and opinions and find out what 
are the possible causes of their manifestation. Since the study has taken 
constructivist approach, the above parameters are considered as social constructs 
that are a subject to change and are not fixed.  
4.5. Positionality 
The researcher is a native of the site where the field work was conducted and the 
biggest motivation for the research stems from there. This ultimately influenced 
the phases of the research process, i.e. procedures and steps employed to conduct 
a research (Bryman, 2008: Ch.1). The author, having been residing outside of the 
country for over 9 years, was puzzled with the problems the country of his origin 
is dealing with. He aspired for the better understanding of the socio-political and 
economic development of his country and to identify some of the key issues that 
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hamper this development. By investigating the profile of a country and the recent 
socio-political developments within,  He came to identify that one of the biggest 
problem in the country is the lack of a general social contract among its citizens. 
With a further understanding of the related concepts and theories the author 
devised a set of questions and assigned the most appropriate method that would 
help in answering those questions.  
When conducting a research, several considerations must be taken into account. 
First and foremost, the author had to consider that his personal and philosophical 
perceptions of the surroundings influence his judgments and evaluations of his 
observations. In order for a reader to understand the underlying assumptions and 
their effects on the findings and conclusions, it has to be specified what are the 
epistemological and ontological convictions of the author. An epistemological 
issue concerns the question of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable 
knowledge (Bryman, 2008). The author’s empirical observations are affected by 
his own ontological conviction. The author sees institutions as being socially 
constructed concepts and perceived differently by various actors. Therefore the 
author is taking a constructionist position and accepts that organizations, cultures 
and thus identities are a product of social interaction and are a subject to change 
(Bryman, 2008: 160). 
 
  
Intergroup Relations and the Perception of Identity Threat 
 
   
25 
 
5. Findings and Analysis 
This research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the attitudes 
concerning the resistance to the state-wide integration and the idea of a shared 
state identity in BiH. More precisely, it aims to facilitate the set of underlying 
reasons of why this occurs by examining the individuals’ perceptions of the 
intergroup relations between Croats and Bosniaks in central Bosnia. Since Croats, 
it is argued, fear Bosniak-dominated state, the study scrutinizes the understanding 
of their own national identity, situations and circumstances under which this 
identity is perceived as threatened. After 9 in-depth interviews, without a 
representative sample, the author generated a list of themes through the process of 
coding and in accordance with the conceptual framework (section 2.). In order to 
better understand the reasons of how and why Croats in central Bosnia perceive 
their national identity to be threatened and answer the research question, it was 
important to examine first how Croats from central Bosnia understand and 
construct their own national identity. 
5.1. Self-Categorization and Intergroup Relations 
5.1.1. Homeland and Belonging 
All subjects identified BiH as their homeland. However, all respondents indicated 
a significant level of national identification with the Republic of Croatia (hereafter 
Croatia). For example, some respondents expressed it in terms of the importance 
assigned to Croatian national sport teams, in contrast to those from BiH. One 
respondent for example stresses: “I care more about Croatian national teams 
whenever they are playing, that’s true. There is something deep inside my 
stomach that shivers. However, whenever there is a team from BiH playing, I also 
hold my thumbs, even though that team consists mostly of Bosniaks” Respondent 
1 (R1). “It is the same with the flag”, she continues, It is prettier and has got much 
more meaning than the BiH flag that some foreigner drew some years ago”. 
Another respondent argues how Croatian sport teams are simply better and 
renowned in the world, plus that there are very little Croatians in BiH sport teams 
and that these are the reasons why he identifies with those coming from Croatia. 
 
Most respondents furthermore categorized Croatia as their second home and/or a 
backup solution if things get ‘worse’ in BiH. Only one person wished to move to 
Croatia at the time being, and would do so as soon as the “situation permits” (R9). 
Some respondents claimed, however, that a choice to move to Croatia is not as 
easy to make as it might seem. First, people have their land, houses, jobs, family 
members, friends, etc. what prevents them from leaving. Second, they claimed 
that they are and will always be looked at differently in Croatia. One interviewee 
claimed that Croats from Croatia are not necessarily fond of Croats from BiH, 
especially when they come to Croatia to take their jobs away. Moreover, 
respondents claim that the economic situation is not ideal in Croatia either and 
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that finding a job there, having no connections, would be quite difficult. Data also 
suggests a certain level of awareness among respondents when it comes to 
problems that stems from the overly attachment and identification with Croatia. 
One respondent is eager to claim: “We have a complex from Croatia. Is that 
normal!? We will have no future here, not until we realize that we don’t live in 
Croatia. Only when we accept that fact, we will be enabled to create our own 
socio-political and cultural body that will know how to define the concept and the 
meaning of ‘Croat from BiH’. (…) The irony is that I am a Croat only in BiH, 
everywhere else, including Croatia, I am just a Bosnian (Bosnian-
Herzegovinian)” (R6). 
 
If we observe the situation from the perspective of SIT, outnumbered groups may 
perceive themselves inferior to dominant groups, i.e. Bosniaks, and consequently 
develop low self-esteem. This might in turn results in negative social identity that 
will trigger negative psychological consequences. One of the defence mechanisms 
in these situations is the re-establishing of a positive social identity through 
emphasising certain characteristics of a group that are favourable only for them. 
One can argue that the need for strong identification with Croatian sport teams 
can be interpreted as a defence mechanism to avoid negative psychological 
consequences triggered by the inferiority complex. First, respondents argued that 
in BiH sport teams are not as good as Croatian teams and that there are very few 
Croats found there. Second, Croats do not have other clearly defined aspects of 
identity, such as political or cultural as one interviewee argues. Thus, because of 
the ‘lack of identity’ in those aspects, Croats use Croatian sport teams as a mean 
to obtain positive self-concept.  
 
Smith (1991) argues that it is the attachments and associations, rather than 
residence in or the possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification (p. 
23). Hence, an ethnie may persist even in the case when it is long divorced from 
its homeland through an intense nostalgia and spiritual attachment. The territory is 
an integral aspect of ethnic identity, as it represents the origins and the past of the 
group living in it or being attached to it, as well as it struggles to conquer it. In 
this way, it becomes a ‘holy ground’, or a sacred land of our forefathers, our kings 
and saints (ibid.). Croats from Croatia and Croats from BiH lived in the same 
country for a period over 100 years (Malcolm, 2002). Croatia’s politics arguably 
shaped the national identity of Croats from BiH during that period. However, 
since the signing of the DPA, Croatia worked in compliance with the efforts of the 
international community and the USA to strengthen joint institutions in BiH, 
directing Croats from BiH towards BiH. “We encourage full Croatian support for 
implementation of the Dayton Accords, (...) and support for strengthening of 
federation and joint institutions in Bosnia (...)” (US Embassy, 2013). Respondents 
claim that BiH is their homeland, yet they share a strong ‘spiritual’ attachment to 
Croatia. However, even though Croatia still might enjoy the status of the ‘holly 
land’, respondents expressed a certain level of a political self-awareness and 
identification with BiH.  
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5.1.2. Croats and Catholicism 
All respondents, without exception, stated their Croatian nationality and identified 
Catholicism as its main characteristic. In the case of one respondent, it becomes 
obvious that she finds it difficult to differentiate between her Croatian nationality 
and her religion: “I am a Catholic, I mean I am a Catholic from BiH. Oh, you 
mean national identity, (haha) I am a Croat from BiH, yes” (R1). Another 
respondent makes an even more direct link: “I am Croatian, because I was 
baptized in a Catholic church” (R7). Yet, not all respondents identified 
themselves as Catholics or as religious “I consider myself Croatian, even though I 
am not religious in any sense”, says a male person from Vitez (R3). Religion or 
Catholicism was, however, the most frequently used term to denote Croatian 
identity in BiH. One person tries to provide an answer to why this occurs: 
“…Croatian national identity in BiH is an area that we all shyly tap into – this 
step towards developing and separating somehow identity of Croats in BiH. I 
mean, to make it Croatian, but BiH Croatian. It is being promoted here and there. 
But, it is being promoted wrongfully, by my opinion, from Franciscan Catholic 
order and based on some kind of catholic Bosnianhood, which is totally ridiculous 
and will never, as such, be legitimate and accepted!” (R5). 
Already Weber argued that religion is “an exceptionally important part in creating 
feelings of ethnic affinity” (Weber and Runciman, 1978: 366). However, as data 
here suggests, the existence of ethnic groups does not require ontological 
collectivism; not everyone that considers himself a Croat in Bosnia is necessarily 
a Catholic. Yet, respondents argued that for the majority of people being a Croat 
in BiH is inevitably linked to one being a Catholic as well. When discussing the 
circumstances that led to this, one respondent offers his own view of the 
underlying reasons behind this: “One should always bear in mind that there are 
ca. 400 000 Croats in BiH and that they do not have any prominent institutions, 
and what’s left of academics among Croats in BiH - it is difficult to channel them 
into an institution so that they could give an opinion about something. (…) We 
cannot finance any meaningful Croatian Institute in BiH, or say, University. The 
promotion coming from Herzegovina is totally insignificant – not to say stupid. It 
is, in fact, a mass production of undereducated students. Croats do not manage 
their own money; we have no money for any academy, any money for any theatre, 
basic cultural needs, let alone money to pay to someone that could create and 
produce an anthem for BiH Croats – an anthem that would suggest that we are a 
self-aware entity (…) Bosniaks have it all - Sarajevo, University, theatres…films 
about how great they are!” The respondent goes on by saying that the 
international community played a significant role in disabling Croats to finance 
mechanisms that would enable Croats to construct and strengthen their Croatian 
identity in BiH in other aspects, not just in ‘clerical terms’: “The fact is that the 
economic resources are taken away from BiH Croats, they do not have economic 
capital anymore, and they have no banks. They had Herzegovina Bank, and then 
army tanks broke into it – after suspicion for money laundry and that it gives 
support to the separate agenda. And it is OK to close it down, but to have army 
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squad and tanks?! That is, if the bank dealt with crime, then state mechanisms of 
prevention should have been present and used, rather than raiding tanks. Even 
today, 13 years after people are unable to withdraw their deposits from the bank. 
I refer to ordinary citizens, not to mention businessmen and companies. This is 
one of the biggest examples of economic theft” (R5). The above implies that there 
is a growing need for other aspects of national identification that do not 
necessarily relate to religion, or Croatia, for that matter.  One could argue that 
Croats are subjects to feelings of a low self-esteem in relation to Bosniaks that 
perpetuate an image of a stronger cultural group.  
5.1.3. Croatian Language 
Few subjects had general difficulty in identifying other aspects of Croatian 
identity apart from religion and one interviewee stresses the following: “I don’t 
think that anyone can tell you what is that that constitutes Croatian identity here 
in BiH, apart from religion.”(R7). Most respondents, however, identified Croatian 
language as another most important aspect of Croatian identity in BiH, but these 
statements were usually followed by a significant doubt about its relevance for 
that matter, often making ironic comments in that regard. However, all of them 
insisted on that they should have the right to speak the language of their choosing 
(Croatian). One respondent makes a frim statement in defence of Croatian 
language as the most important aspect of national identity, but also provide us 
with an insight on how and why this aspect is accentuated in intergroup relations: 
”Preserving of Croatian language, which I personally will never renounce, is one 
of the most important aspects of Croatian identity here in BiH. And, why is this? It 
is because I think that language is the most crucial aspect of any nation. It’s the 
matter of principles as well. Everyone finds it important to feel a member of a 
group. In BiH most people are keen to preserve their own membership to a group 
they already belong to by birth, religion, name… More and more people that I 
know (Bosniaks) try to use those words characteristic of the so called Bosnian 
language; they emphasise the ‘h’ letter where it belongs and where it doesn’t. It is 
ridiculous. We went to high-school together and they never spoke like that, ever. 
We all spoke our common language Serbo-Croatian. Now, every time they 
emphasise one of those words, I return with the same – I use those words that are 
exclusive to Croatian language just to provoke them in return. It is ridiculous, I 
know. Nobody in BiH will ever speak either clear Croatian or Bosniak, or Serbian 
language for that matter” (R1). 
According to Tajfel and Turner (1986) identification with one’s own group 
intensifies, among other reasons, when differences are perceived as impermeable. 
Perhaps one could overcome the importance he or she gives to his or her own 
religion, however, one’s own identity becomes more obvious when it comes to 
which language is one speaking. However, the problem here is that the two groups 
understand each other perfectly and that there is no problem whatsoever in 
communication, apart from the fact that certain individuals emphasise certain 
Intergroup Relations and the Perception of Identity Threat 
 
   
29 
 
words (expressions) or constructions that are exclusive to either Croatian or 
Bosnian language, yet virtually completely understandable to both.  
5.1.4. Croats in Bosnia and Croats in Herzegovina 
Respondents claimed that being a Croat in central Bosnia and being a Croat in 
Herzegovina is not the same thing in connection to how Croats understand and 
experience their socio-political and economic reality based on their geographical 
position and ‘exposure to others’.  These contrasts may have had historic and/or 
ethnographic background, but respondents claimed that the differences are more 
significantly related to the fact that Bosnian Coats have lived, and still do live 
among Bosniaks, and that central Bosnia is still the only truly multi-ethnic region 
in BiH, whereas Croats from Herzegovina live in a more homogenous area. One 
respondent tries to explain: “Because in BiH, the only canton that is multi-ethnic 
is Central Bosnian Canton. If this were not the case, if this canton had a majority 
of one ethnicity (…) - BiH would have clear ethnic boundaries. We had rhetoric of 
Bosnian ‘tiger skin’, where everything was mixed. This rhetoric was valid before 
the war. Now, after the war, everything is mono-ethnic, except central Bosnia. 
Other multi-ethnic municipalities are very homogenized. (…) Central Bosnia is 
really mixed and just because of it, it is impossible to divide BiH. That is, whoever 
tries drawing boundaries within BiH, he will stop at central Bosnia. It cannot 
even be rendered where one village is Bosniak, another Croatian and so 
on.”(R5). 
These captivating differences among Croats in BiH most arguably came from the 
temporary establishment of the Croatian autonomous community (third entity) 
“Herzeg-Bosna” in 2002 as a reaction to the international community’s imposed 
electoral rules that put Croats in an even more underprivileged position relative to 
Bosniak majority. The reason was that this autonomous region excluded a 
significant amount of Croats from Bosnia (Malcolm, 2002). Moreover, these 
differences are realized through the interaction between Croats and Bosniaks in 
central Bosnia and all the experiences and perceptions that arise from it. One 
respondent talks about the importance of a neighbourhood (komsiluk) to an 
average Bosnian-Herzegovinian person and how neighbourhood and the place of 
origin still bears a great importance to people in BiH: “I could never go and live 
in Herzegovina. I would be looked at differently. In BiH, personal status and well-
being is largely based on connections. For example, Herzegovinians would 
always first consider one of ‘their own’ when it comes to employment, or anything 
else. It is like that. All those places in Herzegovina are small towns and villages. 
Everybody knows each other.  Who am I to them?!” (R1). 
Data suggests that there is a growing emancipation of Croats in central Bosnia. 
Even if one considers Croats from BiH as a self-aware entity, ‘divorced’ from 
Croatia, data implies that there appears to be another level of separation and self-
categorization among Croats in BiH. Tajfel and Turner (1986) suggest that if 
status relations are unstable in-group identification intensifies. Given the above 
Intergroup Relations and the Perception of Identity Threat 
 
   
30 
 
accounts and the fact that many Croats from Bosnia felt excluded during the 
temporary establishment of the autonomous community Herzeg-Bosna in 2002, 
one can argue that Croats might perceive their status position inferior to the rest of 
the ‘Croatian community’. 
Every person has a range of different, social identities, including those derived 
from a more clearly defined groups (e.g. professional association, local football 
team, etc.) as well as those referring to a more abstract social category (e.g. 
national identity, fellow Europeans, etc.). A level to which a person can feel 
committed to one group differs from one individual to another (Crisp and 
Hewstone 2001; Haslam and Turner, 1992). This depends on whether individuals 
from one group consider their inclusion, or membership, in one group to be 
characterised by a lower-status and is as such unjust or illegitimate. Data and the 
above self-categorization analysis imply that respondents, being Croats from 
central Bosnia, express low group commitment on multiple levels as they perceive 
their memebership to any group, whether this regards identification with Croatia, 
Croats in BiH, Federation, BiH, or Bosniaks to be relegated to underprivileged 
positions and as being of ‘lower-status’. Moreover, respondents expressed their 
lack of commitment and/or trust to the general political leadership as they 
perceive that politicians only protect their own interest (in the case of HDZ BiH 
and temporary Croatian autonomous entity). 
In a poorly functional and impoverished community that lacks opportunities and 
conditions for the promotion and strengthening of the self-confidence, group 
identification is a powerful source of self-respect. Since our self-comprehension 
depends on our social status it is very important for individuals to evaluate the 
status of the group they belong to. This evaluation is based on the relevant inter-
group comparisons on the basis of which individuals ultimately shape their social 
identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). If a group assesses itself positively in 
comparison to other groups, the identity of that group is determined as positive 
what in turn contributes to mental health of individuals, giving them a sense of 
security, self-respect and belonging (Mummendey, 1985). It can be argued, based 
on the data, that in terms of SIT Croats from central Bosnia are in an inferior 
status position and are a subject to feelings of negative social identity. According 
to Tajfel and Turner (1986) the feelings of negative social identity also involve 
certain coping strategies of the group: discarding the current social identity and 
convert to dominant group or preserving the existing identity and develop a group 
defence mechanism. However, in the context of Croats from central Bosnia, we 
embark on serious limitations of the proposed coping strategies. Given the 
problems pertaining to permeability, Croats will hardly ever convert to dominant 
group (Bosniaks), on the other hand, they also seem not to poses any significant 
defence mechanism by which they can protect their group identity and their social 
self-esteem. Apart from identification with Croatia, data suggests that Croats from 
central Bosnia lack the tools that could ‘elevate their spirit’. Such situation could 
be described as a ‘coping limbo’. 
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5.2. Intergroup relations and the Perception of Threats 
Realistic threats primarily regard the fear of other ethno-national groups in the 
context of resource distribution. By exploring the aspect of realistic threats, the 
author aimed at documenting perceptions of realistic threats among Croats in 
central Bosnia. Most respondents perceived realistic threats in relation to socio-
economic aspects. These aspects were concerning problems that Croats come 
across when running their private businesses and finding employment.  
 
A holder of a medium-large business claims that intensification of inspectons are 
exercised only among Croats in central Bosnia: “Regularly, federal inspections 
that are under the protection of the ruling Bosniak political elite are focused on 
businesses owned by Croats here, and this I whiteness through my daily work 
(…), while businesses of Bosniaks in general and Croats in Herzegovina are 
virtually untouched relative to those of Croats in central Bosnia” (R9). Another 
respondent claims that Croatian businesses are employing Bosniaks in vast 
numbers while the opposite is true for Bosniak businessmen: “Croatian 
businessmen here continue to employ everyone, regardless of their ethnicity, while 
Bosniaks predominantly employ their own. Profit dictates it. The owner of the 
biggest Croatian company (‘X’) is aware of the fact that Bosniaks constitute 
majority here and he employs them in order to ensure greater profit, while one of 
the biggest Bosniak companies (‘Y’) does not employ a single Croat (…) Croats 
are money grabbers first and they don’t care about the consequences it has for the 
Croats here. Furthermore, Croats employ Bosniaks under minimal wages that 
very little Croats will except, and the fact he employs Bosniaks will protect him 
from frequent inspections, because  a cousin of the person that works there is the 
inspector and so on…Croats are spoiled as well, no pay check is good enough 
they think they deserve better, they think – Croatia!” (R3). One respondent 
expresses his concern that the threat is not only coming from Bosniaks, but that 
Croats in central Bosnia are threatened also due to clandestine agendas of the 
Croatian leadership and international community: “Well…It is becoming more 
and more obvious to everyone now. They (Croatian leading nationalist party 
HDZ) are ignoring all the facts by which Croats in central Bosnia are being 
really ’majorized’. They are doing this in order to have less and less Croats living 
in central Bosnia - they want us to move out. They are working on it all the time. 
Without the problematic and multi-ethnic central Bosnia, Herzegovina remains 
politically and ethnically ‘clean’ and those Croats have stronger argument to 
separate from BiH. (...) I mean, what if Herzegovinian part becomes third entity? 
Then our political leaders from central Bosnia (a breach of HDZ – HDZ1990) 
will lose their current political power since they will suddenly become 
“Bosnians” in Herzegovina. The same will happen with all of us – I mean we are 
Bosnians and are perceived and treated as such in Herzegovina (...) It is only a 
question of personal interest and differences between Croats in Bosnia and 
Croats in Herzegovina – no unity in terms of Croatian belongingness or anything 
alike. Unfortunately, it is only a matter of individual political interest. This can 
never happen to Bosniaks. The fact the OHR is approving all of this suggests they 
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want the same too. I only wait for the moment until I will move out and take my 
kids and wife with me, I will not go to Herzegovina.” (R4). As the interviews went 
on, most respondent, clearly agitated by the subject, often commented that the 
only way out of their situation is to leave the country, either to Croatia, or 
preferably to EU that Croatia is now a part of. 
 
Symbolic threats are primarily related to the threat of group identity, its value 
system and worldview (e.g. language, religion, culture) (Duckitt, 2003). From the 
standpoint of the ITT the perception of threat leads to prejudice, regardless of 
whether it is a “real” threat or not (Stephan and Stephan, 2000). The following 
accounts of the respondents can be interpreted as direct representation of symbolic 
threat perception.  
Croatians have pleaded for a national TV in their own language on numerous 
occasions as they felt that the current TV station undermines Croatian language. 
However, up until today Croats in BiH never got their Televison. One respondent 
explains the process through which Croats were denied the right to TV in their 
own language: “…when Croats asked for a TV in the Croatian language, 
Bosniaks denied that right by implying that this is against the vital national 
interest of the Bosniak people. (…)When the Parliament voted for the 
establishment of the TV in Croatian language, then Bosniaks voted against it in 
the House of Peoples. (…)There you go. Lawmakers reasoned it… it does not 
matter how. This issue also went all the way to the Constitutional Court. And now 
listen to what happened… Croatian and Serbian judges voted for the TV, but 
Bosniaks judges voted against, of course. There were also those foreign judges, 
you know and they voted for guess what…they voted against it and their vote is 
worth two votes…This is why we can’t protect our basic national right and our 
identity.”(R2). One testimony showcases a number of aspects through which 
respondents perceive their values and worldviews to be threatened: More and 
more Bosniaks are greeting each other by saying ‘Selam Alejkum’, no matter 
where they are. I hear it in banks, in shops, everywhere, even at the University. 
They even say it to me. You know…University is closed whenever there it is a 
Ramadan, but my friend, who is a Croat, had to go to the exam on Christmas, 
Christmas, I mean…! ‘Selam Alejkum’ is an Islamic greeting. It would be the 
same if I would go to a bank and said ‘Hail Mary’! You could never hear this in a 
public institution before the war. It was either a decent ‘Good day’ or 
‘Hello’(…)Every day, I think, you see a new mosque rising somewhere. Soon 
every house will have a mosque of its own. Fine, I don’t pay for it, some sheik 
pays for it because they come here and they give money for their mosques. But 
what does that mean? Someone can just come here and build religious building 
wherever he pleases. The irony is that many Bosniaks do not appreciate this so 
much either, but everyone is afraid to raise a voice, because a good Bosniak is a 
good Muslim. Also Croats are afraid to say anything about that, because than 
they are accused of being fascists. Some fascists, I say”(R4). In SIT terms the 
perceptions of symbolic threats effect the social identity construction through 
which this identity becomes more in-group oriented and thus ethno-centric.  Data 
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suggests that respondents perceive themselves as members of a group that is 
rather more in tune with civic worldview and that their values and worldview 
represent a lesser obstacle to a shared identity. They perceive religious and 
cultural expressions of Bosniaks as direct provocations and exercise of power and 
domination. Some of them are eager to state that the value system and worldview 
of certain Bosniaks is rather incompatible with the notion of civil society and 
liberal democracy. However, most respondents did not generalize and many 
emphasised that there are Bosniaks that do not pose such threats and are do not 
publicly demonstrate and/or impose their religious and/or cultural views. The 
perception of identity threat is considered the best single predictor of various 
forms of exclusionism and intolerance (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Stephan and 
Stephan, 2001). Political consequences that are likely to occur from perceptions of 
national identity threat are numerous forms of protective policies which can 
furthermore be reflected in terms of reduction of certain civil rights and 
acceptance of repressive protective measures (Cameron et al., 2005). However, it 
appears that Croats from central Bosnia do not actively engage in protectionist 
measures and exclusionism, despite their perceptions of threat in terms of 
economic discrimination. Croats from central Bosnia do not have their own 
territorial unit they can govern autonomously, and they lack appropriate 
institutional representation that might help in reducing their economic 
discrimination. Furthermore, data suggests that Croats in BiH lack a sense of 
political unity among each other what all together might in part explain the lack of 
social actions that would aim at protecting their national integrity in the country. 
One cannot argue that Croats from central Bosnia ultimately benefit from their 
membership in their own group. In SIT terms the lack of benefits that stem from a 
group membership might result in conversion to a dominant group or engaging in 
protective mechanism. However, data suggests, conversion of Croats to dominant 
group is rather implausible due to impermeability and unstable status relations. 
The coping strategy in which Croats try to re-establish their positive self-concept 
are reflected in their efforts to identify with Croatia. However, when it comes to 
identity threats, which in the case of Croats relate predominantly to the issues of 
economic discrimination, consequences appear to be far greater. ITT presupposes 
the existence of inter-group conflict over scarce resources (jobs). This type of 
conflict increases ethnocentrism, intragroup cohesion, and the maintenance and/or 
emergence of negative stereotypes and prejudices. The research indicates that the 
existence of realistic threat perceptions among interviewees doesn’t necessarily 
enhance in-group cohesion amongst Croats in central Bosnia.  A more prominent 
reaction, data suggests, to the perception of threats is a desire to leave the country 
and seek opportunities elsewhere. The situation in which Croatia is a part of EU 
and the fact that most Croats in BiH are entitled to Croatian citizenship (and 
passport) might only help the utilization of these reactions. Thus, if such 
perceptions continue to prevail, they will arguably pose a serious obstacle to the 
prospects of shared sense of identity and cooperation among ethnic groups in 
central Bosnia. In connection to Integrated Contact Hypothesis (Allport, 1954),  
trust and cooperation is encouraged there where people have more opportunities 
to get to know each other, understand each other and share different views on  
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what constitutes their values and their way of life. Thus, it can be argued, if 
intergroup irelations in central Bosnia continue to produce negative results, i.e. 
one group perceives its identity as threatened, the prospects of shared society will 
ultimately be hampered in other regions that are more ethnically homogenous. 
Finally, one can argue that the data arguably challenges the claims posed by 
Belloni (2004) and Bose (2002) that refer to relative harmony of ethnic relations 
in central Bosnia and exaggerations pertaining to concerns of ordinary Croats 
regarding their social status.   
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6. Conclusion 
The analysis suggests that Croats in central Bosnia in general lack group 
commitment to any of the respective groups, be it Croats from Herzegovina or 
Croats from Croatia. The reasons for this occurrence are based on the group’s lack 
of trust in the stability of status relation, i.e. Croats from central Bosnia perceive 
their situation within the larger group (Croats in general) to be of relatively lower 
status what could highly affect their position in the competition for resources. 
Furthermore, they are a subject to negative social identity and low group self-
esteem in relation to Bosniaks. If a group assesses itself positively in comparison 
to other groups, the identity of that group is determined as positive what in turn 
contributes to mental health of individuals, giving them a sense of security, self-
respect and belonging. In SIT terms, the feelings of negative social identity entail 
certain coping strategies of the group - converting to dominant group or 
preserving the existing identity and developing a group defence mechanism. 
However, in the context of Croats from central Bosnia, we embark on serious 
limitations of the assumed coping strategies. Given the problems pertaining to 
permeability, Croats will hardly ever convert to dominant group (Bosniaks). They 
also seem not to possess any significant defence mechanism by which they can 
protect their group identity and through that, their group self-esteem. Apart from 
identification with Croatia, data suggests that Croats from central Bosnia lack the 
tools that could ‘elevate their spirit’. Through investigation of the everyday 
aspects in which Croats from central Bosnia perceive their identity to be 
threatened by Bosniaks, the research identified that the reasons of perceived 
identity threat predominantly stems from the experiences of economic 
discrimination on the basis of which Croats from central Bosnia express the need 
for leaving the country. The consequences are, however, far greater, because if the 
intergroup relation in central Bosnia produces negative results for any of the 
groups, this in turn might send negative signals to the rest of the country where 
people from a more homogenous areas might perceive further integration as a 
condition from which they have far more to lose. It can be argued that the idea of 
further integration will be even more rejected. Thus, the future of a more 
integrated BiH will highly depend on properly managed intergroup relations that 
would allow all three groups to achieve equality in various aspects. This research 
involves the field of human geography through the problematization of 
ethnic/national identity into the field of international development and its efforts 
to create a more stable, tolerant and productive global society.  
The scope and limitation of this research unfortunately did not allow further 
analysis of the data, or the analysis of a greater data pool. This research should be 
conceived more as a preliminary research that tries to tackle the subject of 
national identity from a broader theoretical approach. Each theme of the analysis 
could have been more explored in terms of depth and width. For example, in 
terms of width, each theme could be explored in connection to other 
ethnic/national groups in BiH. In this way, the problem could be assessed from all 
angles what would enable potential comparative analysis. In terms of depth, each 
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theme could have been thin-sliced even further and linked to related and relevant 
theories, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the social phenomena 
and Bosnian-Herzegovinian society in its entirety. Furthermore, issues pertaining 
to war and collective memory have not been examined and included into the 
analysis. The above considerations, thus, suggest the necessity and directions for 
future research. 
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8. Appendix 1 
 
 
- A map of Bosnia and Herzegovina representing BiH Federation (blue), the 
Republic of Srpska (light red) and Brcko District (light green). Source: 
The Centre for Refugee and IDP Studies, University of Sarajevo. (Online) 
Available at: < http://cesi.fpn.unsa.ba/?page_id=601&lang=en>  
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- An ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina . Croats (Hrvati) are 
represented by red, Serbs (Srbi) represented by blue colour and Bosniaks 
(Bosnjaci) represented by green colour. Source: The Centre for Refugee 
and IDP Studies, University of Sarajevo. (Online) Available at: < 
http://cesi.fpn.unsa.ba/?page_id=601&lang=en>  
 
